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By David Hewitson and Guy Marot [ Fenix Insight Ltd. ]
The Falkland Islands Mine Clearance Programme (FI MCP) ran from 2009 to 2020, through five operational phases, some lasting only a few months, some extending across several years. A core objective was to release land as efficiently as possible, only applying technical assets to 
those specific areas of land that justified such attention. This article describes the approach that was 
adopted to determine whether all reasonable effort (ARE) had been applied to each task in such a way 
that current (and future) stakeholders would have confid nce in that decision so as to manage the fear 
of mines being missed.
Two organizations were contracted by the UK government to 
deliver the FI MCP: the land release contractor (LRC), most recently 
SafeLane Global; and the demining program office (DPO) provided 
by Fenix Insight Ltd.1 Additionally, a strategic adviser (Alistair 
Craib) provided advice, oversight, and contracting input. Around 
20,000 anti-personnel (AP) and 5,000 anti-vehicle (AV) mines were 
declared as laid at the time of the 1982 conf lict. In addition to explo-
sive remnants of war (ERW) resulting from ground fighting, naval 
Encouraging Efficient, Confident, and 
Timely Evidence-Based Land Release 
Decision Making 
bombardment, and the abandonment of ammunition, a submuni-
tion threat was also present. Some military clearance took place in 
the immediate aftermath of the conf lict but was stopped following a 
number of accidents to clearance personnel. From 2009 to the dec-
laration of completion at the end of 2020, the FI MCP released over 
23 million m2 from 127 hazardous areas, clearing over 11,000 land-
mines within 2.3 million m2 of cleared ground.
Contractual and Stakeholder Expectations
When the program started in 2009, there was both a contractual 
requirement to exceed the International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS) and a high level of uncertainty among local stakeholders who 
feared that mines would be missed, deminers would die, and the envi-
ronment would be unacceptably damaged by clearance operations. 
All three fears expressed by locals were addressed during the first 
phase of operations through a combination of thorough processes and 
procedures, a high level of transparency, engagement of local environ-
mental stakeholders, and a program of public visits to working sites to 
demonstrate the quality and reliability of the work.
Every clearance program faces an identical fear: that mines might be 
missed. How this is addressed has huge implications for the cost, dura-
tion, and efficiency of program operations. The project efficiency risk is 
that the risk of missing mines will be addressed through the clearance of 
areas that don’t need it just in case. Such an approach imposes avoidable 
costs (often at significant levels) as well as delays, combined with stake-
holder dissatisfaction, impatience, and implications for international 
treaty compliance. Professional, reputational, and contractual fears 
about missing mines are further compounded when there is additional 
uncertainty about legal liability. The FI MCP was contracted under 
English Law in a context in which criminal and civil liability, includ-
ing corporate manslaughter cases, are established and often publicized.
The stated objective of the program was to release designated land 
by “applying all reasonable effort to … remove all suspicion of mines/
ERW … and to reduce the remaining risk from explosive hazards to as 
low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).”2 
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ALARP and ARE are distinct but closely-related terms. They sit 
either side of the decision to release point in the land release process: 
the application of ARE to an area confirmed or suspected of contain-
ing explosive ordnance (EO) hazards should result in a residual risk 
that is ALARP. There are no recognized, defined criteria for what con-
stitutes either ARE or ALARP, although guidance exists in a number 
of areas, including in IMAS and in UK Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) publications.3 
The approach adopted in the Falkland Islands was based on a num-
ber of basic principles:
• The word reasonable in both ARE and ALARP indicates an 
expectation of logical, transparent reasoning based upon reli-
able evidence to support decision-making.
• The effort encapsulated in ARE is not just the physical effort of 
clearing land but includes enabling effort in training people, 
selecting and using appropriate equipment, establish-
ing and implementing effective quality and information 
management systems, and using evidence to support 
decisions (Figure 1).
• The decision to declare that ARE has been applied and 
that no further activity is required before releasing the 
site only has value if other stakeholders agree.
The challenge, implicit within the concept of ARE, is to rec-
ognize that ARE has been applied at the earliest point in a land 
release task without undershooting the decision (i.e., releasing 
land before it is completely clear of EO hazards). The inevita-
ble natural inclination is to overshoot—processing more land 
than is absolutely necessary, just to be on the safe side. In most 
Figure 1. Conceptual illustration of the enabling and task level 
approach to all reasonable effort (ARE). 
Developed by David Hewitson for the GICHD.
real-world cases there is at least some uncertainty. That means that 
some overshoot will be unavoidable if all stakeholders are to agree with 
the decision. There were some sites in the Falkland Islands where large 
numbers of mines were present, regularly laid out, undisturbed, and 
fully recorded, taking the ARE decision as close to the theoretical ear-
liest point as is realistically possible (with fewer than 10 m2 cleared per 
mine found). Alternatively, there were others sites where there was no 
record, substantial changes had occurred since the conflict, and only 
one or two mines remained in large areas, making it much harder to 
assess ARE (resulting in over 15,000 m2 per mine).
The Falkland Islands were physically and 
logistically challenging for clearance operations.
All graphics courtesy of the authors.
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 General Approach and Background
A lack of stakeholder confidence in released land often arises from 
uncertainty about why key land-release decisions were taken. Task doc-
umentation frequently consists of a disparate collection of paperwork 
that can be hard for an individual reader, especially one not familiar 
with the task, to understand holistically. Even an expert will often have 
significant questions when reviewing such documents about what hap-
pened and why. While everything may have made complete sense to 
managers on the ground at the time of the work, if the task documen-
tation does not provide clear and accessible explanations, then later 
readers are left feeling unsure about what went on and why, and IMAS 
07.14 defines risk as “the effect of uncertainty on objectives.”4 A future 
developer looking to use the land for a public project may determine 
that further technical activity is necessary just in case. Any such action 
diminishes, and in some cases wholly destroys the worth of the origi-
nal work, with all its costs, use of resources, and physical risk.
In 2010, co-author David Hewitson worked with Bob Eaton of the 
Survey Action Centre to develop a process-driven approach to land 
release for the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre. The project included 
development of a core document that would tell the story of the site. 
The document aimed to explain:
• what EO to expect at the site (and why);
• how these expectations were reflected in the operational plan;
• what was actually found during operations; and
• what decisions were taken during operations in light of what was 
actually found.
Readers of the completed document should understand the task 
process from start to finish as a connected narrative that makes sense 
and leaves them confident in the decision to release the land as safe for 
use. Other associated documents, such as daily narrative logs, detailed 
mapping, quality management records, and certificates should also be 
available for reference where necessary. However, the site implementa-
tion plan (SIP) would be the heart of the documented explanation of 
what happened. The process (Figure 2) and associated documentation 
developed during that work was adopted in the FI MCP.
Stage 1: Tasking
In accordance with broader contractual requirements, a task order 
specifies the hazardous area to be processed but does not specify land 
release methods or any other technical details.
Stage 2: Information Collection
A fundamental part of the ARE process is identifying, access-
ing, and making use of all available information—not just informa-
tion about the intended task site but also about the wider context of 
operations and contamination, including evidence from previously 
completed tasks. In the FI MCP, information was available from a 
number of sources:
• original Argentine records in Spanish created by the minelay-
ing organizations and available for many (but not all) sites, 
including sketch maps, number and types of mines, among 
other details 
• translated UK military records in English; essentially the same 
as the original records (although with occasional transcription 
errors), including additional, limited details from 1982 at those 
sites where UK military clearance took place, and informa-
tion about clearance (usually of individual visible mines) that 
occurred over subsequent years
• information in published historical accounts
• information from interviews with veterans
• interviews with local people who were present before, during, 
and after the conflict
Further information became available as the clearance program 
progressed:
• comparison of what was actually found on the ground during 
previous clearance operations versus information in mine-
field records, allowing a general assessment of the reliability 
of records as well as results of detailed analysis (such as error 
brackets for distances and bearings recorded on maps)
• other lessons learned during operations
• real-world operational key performance indicators (KPIs)
Significant effort to identify and access potentially relevant infor-
mation was applied by the LRC throughout the program, recog-
nizing the importance of doing so to drive confident and credible 
decision-making.
Stage 3: Analysis and Planning 
In addition to analysis of the expected threat type, detectability, and 
distribution, planning included geometric analysis of the expected 
arrangement of mines: in rows and panels, orientation, and separa-
tion. A key concept was that of the minimum survey target (MST): 
the smallest associated packet of mines defined in terms of numbers of 
mines, numbers of rows, separation of rows, and separation of panels. 
In some cases, planners might have confidence that they were looking 
for a combination of multiple rows of mines in several panels. In oth-
ers there might be no record but evidence that, if mines were present, 
they would be in at least a certain quantity and arrangement (based on 
evidence that mines had never been laid in less than a given arrange-
ment). On other occasions, particularly in areas that had been subject 
to partial historical clearance, the MST might be a single mine.
The analysis of the MST drove decisions about the width and sepa-
ration of targeted technical survey (TS) lanes as well as those cases 
(where the MST was one or a very small number of mines) when tar-
geted block clearance would be employed. Geometric analysis of the 
MST was applied to ensure confidence that any targeted TS could not 
go through a contaminated area without encountering at least one 
piece of evidence of mines present, nor could adjacent lanes go either 
side of a contaminated area (bracketing). In many areas the third 
dimension of depth was also important, reflecting the effects of peat or 
sand accumulation on top of the original mine contamination layer.5 
Further analysis was conducted to identify the most appropriate 
areas to target during TS. Where present, records often used paces or 
3
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Figure 2. The overall SIP process.
The deep peat of the Falkland 
Islands made working conditions 
difficult.
double paces as units of distance, bearings were taken using handheld 
compasses, and reference points had often disappeared or were hard to 
identify. Part of the ARE approach included analysis effort using reverse 
engineering on completion of site operations to compare the locations 
of actual finds, with distances and directions, against details in records. 
This allowed pool of error assessments during planning for subsequent 
tasks of where mines might be (if they were still in undisturbed rows) 
or had originally been (if identifying areas requiring block clearance). 
Moreover, the closing the loop effort was an important part of the overall 
approach to demonstrating the reasoning aspect of ARE decisions.
The resulting plan provided program managers, as well as those who 
would sign clearance certificates, with confidence that if no evidence of 
mines was found in an area, then it could reasonably be concluded that 
no mines were present. In doing so, the analysis laid the foundation 
for the decision-making that would take place during the operational 
phase to identify when ARE had been applied and when it was justified 
to stop operations and declare the area safe for release.
Stage 4: Initial Review
The draft plan, prepared by the LRC, was reviewed by the DPO. Any 
comments or questions were resolved before sign-off by both parties. 
The process was both transparent and represented clear liability risk 
sharing throughout.
Stage 5: Implementation
Implementation followed the agreed plan but with a constant 
review process considering the implications of new information, 
whether it was the discovery of mines where predicted or the absence 
of mines where expected. New information could reinforce confidence 
4
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Figure 3. Example of key decisions in the field review and change log (Site SA 077). Note inclusion of environmental remediation in 
the effort applied at the task site.
Figure 4. Logging of a technical response to newly discovered information (SA 059).
in the planning assumptions or call them into question. Whenever 
the unfolding situation allowed refinement of the plan, or where it 
demanded a rethink, such considerations were documented in the 
Field Review and Change Log section of the SIP (Figures 3 and 4). 
In each case the LRC would discuss their thinking with the DPO, 
and (once accepted) the decision log in the SIP would be signed by 
both parties. The relationship was one of cooperative independence. 
The DPO was prepared to ask for and review any evidence, and to 
question the reasoning behind decisions to ensure that whatever was 
captured in the record would make sense to future readers without 
prior knowledge of the task.
Through the logs, key decisions were captured about when it was 
appropriate to declare the site mine free, allowing a switch to battle 
area clearance (BAC) methods, as well as the point at which ARE had 
been applied in full. In every case, the countersignature by the DPO 
helped both the general credibility of the decisions and ensured that 
any perception of liability risk was shared between the DPO and the 
LRC, reducing the risk of conducting extended clearance just in case, 
while encouraging early and efficient completion of operations. 
The LRC’s high-quality survey and mapping was a key component 
of the decision-making process, allowing LRC managers and DPO 
reviewers to see the evidence on site in a clear geographical context. 
Review and comparison of what was found against information in 
records, as well as evidence gained at previous sites, helped identify 
areas where missing mine drills (MMDs) were required. The SIP pro-
vided a collaborative approach to looking at what had been found, 
where definite or potential gaps might be present, why those gaps exist, 
and what the extent of any additional clearance would be to show that 
ARE had been applied. 
Stage 6: Final Review
At the end of every task a post-completion analysis and management 
review were carried out and captured in the SIP. Their purpose was to 
close the loop between the experience gained on the specific task and 
the wider body of accumulated evidence-based knowledge that would 
feed into planning of future tasks. 
The analysis and review addressed:
• results of quality assurance and quality control inspections
• results of any nonconformities, accidents, or complaints
• how reliably planning information related to what was actually 
found
• efficiency of switching between TS, mine clearance, and BAC 
activities
• identification of any new information that might call into ques-
tion wider planning assumptions
• recommendations for improvement, including follow-up actions
• KPI results
5
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Heavy machinery was required to work in extreme weather.
Figure 5. Extract from SIP for site SA 053, including standardized KPIs.
Observations, conclusions, actions required
• Results of quality-assurance and quality-control inspections.  
There were no QA observations. Post clearance quality control sampling 
revealed no non-conformities.
• Land release process performance (key performance indicators/rations).
• Average demining rate 11.12 m2/deminer/day (6hr)
• Average efficiency 9.492/mine
• Average deminer day/mine 0.85 deminer days/mine
• BAC rate 656.21 m2/deminer/day
• Quality non-conformances, complaints, accidents. Nil
• Recommendations for improvement. Nil
• Follow-up actions arising from the review. Nil
Conclusions
the umbrella of ARE. The performance indicators captured at the end 
of every task provided a solid basis for the planning of both individual 
sites and projections for overall program progress.
Most importantly, the completed SIP provides a transparent, com-
prehensive record of the decisions taken and evidence associated, 
all the way through the task life cycle: from initial planning, to in-
progress operational decision-making, to the final decision to declare 
Some suggest that the FI MCP was easy because of the availability of 
records for which many other programs don’t have comparable, avail-
able information sources. Although certainly true that records are help-
ful, for many sites in the Falkland Islands they were either unavailable 
or of limited use. Additionally, partial clearance immediately after the 
conflict left a situation of utter uncertainty. Even where records are reli-
able, there is still a responsibility on mine action operators to make best 
use of those records to drive efficiency, achieve safe 
release of land at the earliest possible opportunity, 
reduce the demands on public money, and make 
resources available for other work.
Throughout the FI MCP, both the LRC and DPO 
placed constant, rigorous emphasis on the collec-
tion and use of information to drive decision-mak-
ing about when ARE had been applied in such a 
way that other stakeholders would understand and 
accept those decisions. The SIP helped program 
planners and monitors to focus on the task at hand. 
It helped them to think about what they were doing 
and why, and encouraged them to consider all rel-
evant factors (enabling and on-site) that fell under 
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Penguins are not heavy enough to detonate 
landmines and roamed freely among the 
minefields.
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that ARE had been applied and the land was safe to release, to (equally 
importantly) the feedback loop to support improved ARE decision-
making at later sites. 
At every stage, and in every respect, the common thread in the way 
that FI MCP program managers approached their task was through 
relentless, comprehensive, and careful collection and use of opera-
tional contextual and performance data, constantly reducing uncer-
tainty, and by extension risk, in every aspect of the program—from 
technical procedures to prioritization and planning at both task and 
strategic levels. The methods used, in particular the SIP, were founded 
on original work carried out in Tajikistan and refined for the needs of 
the FI MCP, but are applicable to any mine action program. 
One experienced and knowledgeable mine action practitioner who 
visited the Falkland Islands’ program said that, before they arrived, 
they thought that the FI MCP’s approach to documenting land release 
planning and decision-making would prove excessive. By the time they 
left they were firmly of the opinion that the SIP approach should actu-
ally be the minimum applied in any mine action program. 
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Applying “All Reasonable Effort” in the Falkland Islands Mine Clearance Programme: Encouraging Efficient, Confident, and 
Timely Evidence-Based Land Release Decision Making 
by David Hewitson and Guy Marot [ Fenix Insight Ltd. ]
1. Previous incarnations of the LRC, responsible for work in earlier phases of the programme included Bactec International Ltd and Dynasafe 
Bactec Ltd. 
2. From Phase 5 project contractual documentation, Section 4 – Statement of Service Requirement.
3. IMAS 07.11 Land Release, Edition 1, Amendment 5, February 2019, includes broad guidance on the process elements influencing ARE. The 
recently released TNMA 07.11/03 All Reasonable Effort (ARE), Version 1.0, March 2021, provides more detailed advice on what constitutes ARE 
and how to demonstrate its application. Sources such as https://www.hse.gov.uk/managing/theory/alarpglance.htm explain the concept and 
practice of ALARP.
4. IMAS 07.14 Risk Management in Mine Action, First Edition, February 2019, section 3 Terms, definitions and abbreviations.
5. In some case over 40cm of peat had ‘grown’ over the 1982 mine layer surface level, and on beach areas 11m of sand had accumulated.
6. Suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in the Falkland Islands were likely to contain other forms of ERW as well as mines.  Mine clearance proce-
dures were targeted only on those parts of the SHA where mines were expected until the LRC and DPO were confident that they had all been 
found and dealt with.  At that point the remaining area within the fenced boundary of the SHA could be searched for non-landmine UXO 
(mortar rounds, grenades, etc.) using the much faster BAC techniques. At some SHAs less than 5 percent of the total SHA area was subject to 
mine clearance procedures, but the entire area needed to be checked for other UXO hazards.
ENDNOTES
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